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Commercial Transportation
by Stephen G. Lowry*
Madeline E. McNeeley"
Kristy S. Davies*
and Yvonne S. Godfrey'
I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial transportation involves all of the significant forms of
passenger and property transportation across the United States. This
Article covers five major areas: (1) trucking; (2) aviation; (3) limousines,
taxis, rideshare services, and commercial transit; (4) autonomous
vehicles; and (5) railroads. This Article surveys significant judicial and
legislative developments in Georgia commercial transportation law
during the period from the beginning of the 2012 regular session of the
151st Georgia General Assembly through May 31, 2017.1
Each of the areas covered are subject to heavy federal regulation.
Much of this Article discusses Georgia's interaction with federal

*Partner in the firm of Harris Lowry Manton LLP, Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia.
University of Maryland, Baltimore County (B.A., magna cum laude, 1995); Lewis and Clark
College, Northwestern School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1998). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
*Associate in the firm of Harris Lowry Manton LLP, Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia.
University of Tennessee (B.A. & B.S., magna cum laude, 1999); University of Maryland,
College Park (M.S., 2001); University of Tennessee College of Law (J.D., summa cum laude,
2008). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Tennessee.
**Associate in the firm of Harris Lowry Manton LLP, Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.A., magna cum laude, 2006); Florida State University School of
Law (J.D., 2010). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
**Associate in the firm of Harris Lowry Manton LLP, Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia.
Rhodes College (B.A., cum laude, 2003); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. The sixty-ninth volume of the Mercer Law Review marks the first appearance of
the Commercial Transportation survey. As such, this Article covers an expanded survey
period (Jan. 16, 2012-May 31, 2017).
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regulations and laws pertaining to each area. It is apparent that the
General Assembly struggles to keep up with the rapid technological and
business changes for commercial transportation.

II. TRUCKING AND COMMERCIAL TRANSIT
Effective July 1, 2012, Georgia's former Motor Carrier Act 2 was
repealed and replaced with the Georgia Motor Carrier Act of 2012
(GMCA). 3 The GMCA regulates and controls for-hire transportation of
persons and property "to protect public welfare, provide for a competitive
business environment, and provide for consumer protection." 4 To this
end, the GMCA "shall be liberally construed." 5 With certain exceptions, 6
the GMCA regulates all motor carriers, 7 including "[e]very person
owning, controlling, operating, or managing any motor vehicle, including
the lessees, receivers, or trustees of such persons . . . used in the business
of transporting for hire persons, household goods, or property . . . for hire
over any public highway" in Georgia. 8 Essentially, the GMCA regulates
all tractor-trailers and for-hire transportation services, including
passenger bus lines. 9 Importantly, the Georgia Public Service
Commission (the Commission) adopted The Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (FMCSR)IO issued by the United States Department of
Transportation.11

2. Georgia Motor Carrier Act of 1931, 1931 Ga. Laws 199 (previously codified at
O.C.G.A. §§ 46-7-1-101 (2011)), repealed by Georgia Motor Carrier Act of 2012, Ga. H.R.
Bill 865, 2012 Ga. Laws 580 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-50-57 (2017)).
3. Georgia Motor Carrier Act of 2012, Ga. H.R. Bill 865, 2012 Ga. Laws 580 (codified
at O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-50-57).
4. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-51 (2017).
5. Id.
6. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-100(12)(B) (2017).
7. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-101(a) (2017).
8. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-100(12)(A) (2017).
9. The term "motor carrier" does not include school buses; "[tiaxicabs which operate
within the corporate limits of municipalities and are subject to regulation by the governing
authorities of such municipalities"; limousine carriers; hotel passenger or baggage vehicles;
"[m]otor vehicles operated not for profit with a capacity of 15 persons or less when they are
used exclusively to transport elderly and disabled passengers or employees under a
corporate sponsored vanpool program," with exceptions; vehicles owned and operated
exclusively by state or federal government; vehicles "capable of transporting not more than
ten persons when such vehicles are used exclusively to transport persons who are elderly,
disabled" for medical care or prescription medication; and ambulances. O.C.G.A.
§§ 40-1-100(12)(A)-(B). For more on taxicab and limousine regulation, see infra Section IV.
10. 49 C.F.R. §§ 350-399.
11. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 515-16-4-.01 (2017).
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In addition to complying with the FMCSR, any motor carrier operating
on the public highways of Georgia must "[o]btain a certificate ...
[in] aintain liability insurance ... [and] [a] ct in compliance with Georgia's
workers' compensation laws."1 2 Georgia's direct-action statute permits a
claimant in any tort or contract action to name not only the motor carrier
but its insurance carrier as a defendant in the action.1 3 The direct action
statute even applies to insurers of interstate carriers engaging in
intrastate transport in Georgia that are otherwise not registered as an
intrastate motor carrier in Georgia.14 In 2017, Georgia's minimumfinancial-liability limits for intrastate carriers were $100,000 for bodily
injury or death to one person, with a $300,000 aggregate limit for
multiple personal injuries or deaths in a twelve-passenger-or-fewer
vehicle, and a $500,000 aggregate limit for multiple personal injuries or
deaths involving a thirteen-passenger-or-more vehicle.15 To the extent
the motor carrier operates in interstate or foreign commerce, the FMCSR
minimum levels of financial responsibility for vehicles transporting nonhazardous commodities is $750,000,16 while the minimum levels for
vehicles transporting the most hazardous substances require a minimum
of $5,000,000.17 While more pronounced for intrastate motor carriers,
both the minimum limits for intrastate and interstate carriers will often
leave the motor carrier woefully underinsured. Collisions involving large
trucks and tractor-trailers can cause not only severe catastrophic injuries
but, in many cases, multiple catastrophic injuries where $300,000,
$500,000, or $750,000 will not even cover victims' medical expenses. This
is an area in desperate need of review at both the state and federal levels.
The FMCSR require an MCS-90 endorsement to be attached to all
insurance policies.18 This ensures compliance with the FMCSR and that
"injured members of the public are able to obtain judgment from
negligent authorized interstate carriers."19 The endorsement makes the
insurer liable to third parties for any injury resulting from the negligent

12. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-101 (2017).
13. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112 (2017).
14. Bramlett v. Bajric, No. 1:12-CV-2148-TWT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148797, at *6
7 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2012).
15. GA. CoMp. R. & REGS. 515-16-11-.03 (2017).
16. 49 U.S.C. § 31139(b) (2017).
17. Hazardous substances as defined in 49 C.F.R. § 171.8 (2017) and 49 C.F.R.
§ 173.403 (2017) require $5 million, while oil and hazardous substances as defined in 49
C.F.R. § 172.101 (2017) and 49 C.F.R. § 171.8 (2017), respectively, require $1 million. 49
U.S.C. § 31139(d) (2017).
18. 49 C.F.R. § 387.15 (2017).
19. Aequicap Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 303 Ga. App. 508, 512, 693 S.E.2d 863, 866-67
(2010).
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use of any motor vehicle by the insured even if the vehicle is not covered
under the insurance policy, such as leased vehicles. 20 However, while the
GMCA "contemplates that a motor carrier can be engaged in both
interstate and intrastate commerce, [it will] not impose federal financial
responsibility limits on an interstate motor carrier that is engaged in
intrastate commerce [of nonhazardous commodities at the time] of the
accident." 21 This is the case even if the applicable policy has a MCS-90
endorsement for higher limits. 22 It is difficult to understand how a motor

carrier with a minimum-coverage policy could somehow argue that a
lower amount of coverage should apply. In any event, these low limits
further harm the victims of truck crashes and leave motor carriers
exposed to excess judgments.
The GMCA, through its adoption of the FMCSR, sets forth a multitude
of safety standards supporting negligence and negligence per se claims.
This includes the duty of a motor carrier to maintain a driver
qualification file with the driver's application for employment, motor
vehicle record, 23 certificate of driver's road test,24 an annual-review-ofdriving record, and a list25 of the driver's violations of motor vehicle laws
and ordinances. 26 Similarly, the FMCSR sets strict standards concerning
a driver's allowable driving time, 27 equipment inspections and
maintenance, 28 and alcohol and drug use. 29 In the past five years, Georgia
state and federal courts have seen an increase in claims of third-party
liability and independent claims against the motor carrier for negligent
hiring, supervision, and retention.
An employer is required to "exercise ordinary care in the selection of
employees and not to retain them after knowledge of incompetency." 30

20. Id. at 511-12, 693 S.E.2d at 866-67.
21. Grange Indem. Ins. Co. v. Burns, 337 Ga. App. 532, 540-41, 788 S.E. 138, 144
(2016) (emphasis in original).
22. Id.
23. Among other investigations and inquiries, 49 C.F.R. § 391.23(a)(1) (2017) requires
"[a]n inquiry to each State where the driver held or holds a motor vehicle operator's license
or permit during the preceding 3 years." 49 C.F.R. 391.23(a)(1).
24. The road test standards are set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 391.31 (2017).
25. Section 391.27 provides "each motor carrier shall, at least once every 12 months,
'require each driver it employs to prepare and furnish it with a list of all violations of motor
vehicle traffic laws and ordinances . . . of which the driver has been convicted or on account
of which he or has forfeited bond or collateral." 49 C.F.R. § 391.27(a) (2017).
26. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.51 (2017).
27. 49 C.F.R. §§ 392.3, 395.3, 395.5 (2017).
28. 49 C.F.R. §§ 392.7-.9 (2017).
29. 49 C.F.R. §§ 392.4-.5 (2017).
30. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (2017).
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Thus, under Georgia law, "the appropriate standard of care in a negligent
hiring/retention action is 'whether the employer knew or should have
known the employee was not suited for the particular employment."' 31
"An employer generally is not responsible for torts committed by his
employee when the employee exercises an independent business and in
it is not subject to the immediate direction and control of the employer." 32
In other words, employers are not accountable for the negligence of
independent contractors when "the employer has no right of control over
the manner in which the work is to be done," 33 and "[the contractor],

rather than the employer, is the proper party to be charged with the
3
responsibility for preventing the risk." 4

In the case of motor carrier law, however, this general rule does not
apply. Instead, "the motor carrier is fully responsible to the public for the
operation of its leased vehicles, regardless of whether the vehicles are
used in the scope of the carrier's business .

. .

. This doctrine of strict

vicarious liability imposed upon the lessee motor carrier is known as
'statutory employment."' 35 Several recent cases illustrate the application
of this principle.
In Bramlett v. Bajric, the plaintiff suffered injuries in a collision in
Georgia with a tractor-trailer owned by DAL Express Transportation
(DAL). DAL leased the tractor-trailer to DSL Express Trucking (DSL), a
Florida interstate motor carrier that was not registered in Georgia and
did not engage in intrastate transport within Georgia. Both DAL and
DSL moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision of the driver.36
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
found DSL, rather than DAL, vicariously liable for the driver's actions at
the time of the collision because 49 C.F.R. § 376.1237 "requires motor
carriers using leased equipment to 'have exclusive possession, control,
and use of the equipment for the duration of the lease' and to 'assume
complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment during the
duration of the lease."' 3 8 The court characterized

the relationship

31. Western Indus., Inc. v. Poole, 280 Ga. App. 378, 381-82, 634 S.E.2d 118, 121 (2006)
(emphasis in original).
32. O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4 (2017).
33. Ga. Messenger Serv. v. Bradley, 311 Ga. App. 148, 149, 715 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2011).
34. Wilann Props. I, LLC v. Ga. Power Co., 321 Ga. App. 297, 305, 740 S.E.2d 386, 392
(2013).
35. PN Exp., Inc. v. Zegel, 304 Ga. App. 672, 675-76, 697 S.E.2d 226, 230 (2010); see
also 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1) (2017).
36. Bramlett, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148797, at *2-4.
37. 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 (2017).
38. Bramlett, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148797, at *13-15 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 376.12).
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between the parties and equipment as that of a bailment, in which case
"an employee of the bailor is a borrowed servant of the hirer (1) if the
hirer had complete control and direction of the bailor's employee for the
occasion, whereas the bailor had no such control, and (2) if the hirer had
the exclusive right to discharge the bailor's employee." 39 As DSL
maintained consistent contact with Bajric during the drive, inspected his
logs, verified his fuel receipts, and organized his shipping routes, DSL
sufficiently controlled the driver and trailer to invoke the "borrowed
servant doctrine and face vicarious liability." 40
In Aycock v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., LLC,41 the plaintiff filed a
wrongful-death claim arising out of United States Pipe and Foundry
Company's negligent hiring and supervision of Atlas Transport, "a motor
carrier whose driver allegedly caused the fatal collision." 42 The defendant
moved to dismiss the plaintiffs negligent hiring and supervision claims,
alleging that Georgia law does not recognize liability against a broker or
shipper for the negligent selection of an independent motor carrier. 43
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
found that, while the defendant correctly stated the general rule that
employers are not liable for the negligent acts of an independent
contractor, the plaintiffs complaint created reasonable inferences that
the necessary servant or agency relationship existed. 44 Specifically,
plaintiffs allegation that the "[d]efendant 'hired' Atlas Transport,
'selected' Atlas Transport, personally loaded the trailer, and arranged for
the transportation of goods [was] sufficient to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery [would] reveal evidence of the defendant's
liability." 45 The court further emphasized that McLaine v. McLeod 46 "does
not stand for the proposition that Georgia law insulates all shippers and
brokers from liability for the negligent acts of a motor carrier." 47
The legal theories regarding brokers, third-party logistics companies,
and shippers are evolving in Georgia and across the country. To
successfully state a claim against a broker, shipper, or other third party
involving the hiring of a motor carrier, the plaintiff must show more than
39. Id. at *13 (quoting Coe v. Carroll & Carroll, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 777, 780, 709 S.E.2d
324, 329 (2011)).
40. Id. at *14.
41. No. 1:13-CV-3-(WLS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91625 (M.D. Ga. June 28, 2013).
42. Id. at *1-2.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *7.
45. Id. at *7-8 (quoting Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.
2012)).
46. 291 Ga. App. 335, 661 S.E.2d 695 (2008).
47. Aycock, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91625, at *8.
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an independent-contractor relationship between the motor carrier and
third party. 48 While Georgia has not had many cases involving the
liability of brokers and logistics companies, there are sure to be more in
the future. Some of the theories of liability attempted-with varying
degrees of success-are negligent hiring, vicarious liability, negligent
maintenance, and joint venture. 49
"Under Georgia law, respondeat superior and negligent hiring,
training, supervision, retention, and entrustment are mutually exclusive
theories of liability."5 0 Thus, when an employer admits the applicability
of respondeat superior, it is entitled to summary judgment on claims of
negligent entrustment, hiring, and retention.5 1 However, some courts
have questioned this finding after the Georgia General Assembly adopted
apportionment of damages. 52 Further, when a "plaintiffhas a valid claim
for punitive damages against the employer based on its independent
negligence in hiring and retaining the employee or entrusting a vehicle to
such employee" evidence of the negligence claims are not considered
"merely duplicative of the respondeat superior claim" and "the employer
is not entitled to summary judgment on the negligent entrustment,
hiring, and retention claims." 53

In Cooper v. Marten Transport, Ltd.,'5 the plaintiff sued a motor
carrier and its driver following the tractor-trailer's rear-end collision

48. See McLaine, 291 Ga. App. at 339-40, 661 S.E.2d at 699-700; see also O.C.G.A.
34-7-20, 51-2-4 (2017).
49. This discussion is beyond the scope of this review because that discussion involves
cases from other jurisdictions. However, some of the cases that have explored these theories
include: Riley v. AK Logistics, Inc., 1:15-cv-00069-JAR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88814 (E.D.
Mo. June 9, 2017) (negligent hiring and vicarious liability); Ramos-Becerra v. Hatfield,
1:14-CV-00917, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136705 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016) (negligent hiring);
Beavers v. Victorian, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (W.D. Okla. 2014) (negligent hiring); Jones v. CH
Robinson Worldwide, 558 F. Supp. 2d 630 (W.D. Va. 2008) (negligent hiring); Schramm v.
Foster, 341 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2004) (negligent hiring); McHale v. W.D. Trucking, 39
N.E.3d 595 (Ill. App. 2015) (vicarious liability); Sperl v. CH Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 946
N.E.2d 463 (Ill. App. 2011) (vicarious liability); Johnson v. Pacific Intermountain Express,
662 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1983) (joint venture); Puckering v. ATI Transp., Inc., 897 A.2d 1034
(N.J. 2006) (negligent hiring).
50. Wiedeman v. Canal Ins. Co., No. 1:15-CV-4182-WSD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95167,
at *11 (N.D. Ga. June 21, 2017).
51. MasTec N. Am., Inc. v. Wilson, 325 Ga. App. 863, 865, 755 S.E.2d 257, 259 (2014).
52. See Little v. McClure, 5:12-CV-147 (MTT), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120681, at *9
(M.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2014) (stating "it is clear the apportionment statute removes the
rationale for granting summary judgment on negligent hiring, retention, and training
claims purely based on the employer's admission of respondeatsuperior.").
53. MasTec, 325 Ga. App. at 865, 755 S.E.2d at 259 (2014) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Kelley v. Blue Line Carriers, 300 Ga. App. 577, 580, 685 S.E.2d 479, 483 (2009)).
54. No. 1:10-CV-03044-JOF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191104 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2012).
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with the plaintiffs vehicle on an interstate exit ramp. Although the truck
driver testified he was driving only four miles per hour at the time of the
crash, he was cited for "following too closely" and "too fast for conditions."
The evidence showed that the motor carrier's company policy required
review of a two-year driving history, rather than a three-year driving
history as required by federal regulations. Nevertheless, when the driver
was hired in 2010, the motor carrier was aware of the driver's nine
speeding citations, two vehicle accidents, violations of on-duty hour
limitations, failure to complete log books, and probation for abuse of
equipment between 1999 and 2007.55 The court found the driver "clearly

demonstrated a propensity to drive too fast, in both personal and
commercial vehicles, and [the motor carrier] hired him with that
knowledge in mind." 56 This fact, combined with the motor carrier's

knowledge of federal regulations and "company policy to willfully and
consciously disregard the federal regulations," was sufficient to preclude
summary judgment on the plaintiffs negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision claims against the motor carrier, even though the carrier had
57
admitted respondeat superior.
In Wiedeman v. Canal Insurance Co.,68 the plaintiff was injured in a
collision with a box truck and subsequently filed an action against the
driver and the driver's employer. The employer admitted respondeat
superior and moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs negligent
hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment claims, as well as his
claim for punitive damages against the employer. 59 The plaintiff argued
that the carrier violated federal regulations and failed to investigate the
driver's qualifications, driving record, and criminal record, which would
have revealed drug and alcohol convictions.60 The court granted
summary judgment on plaintiffs negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision claims.61
Plaintiffs may survive summary judgment on an independent claim of
negligent hiring and prove punitive damages are warranted "by showing
that the employer had actual knowledge of numerous and serious
violations on its driver's record, or, at the very least, when the employer

55. Id. at *1-5.
56. Id. at *15.
57. Id.
58. No. 1:15-cv-4182-WSD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95167 (N.D. Ga. Jun 21, 2017).
59. Id. at *1-4; see also Corbett v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1233TWT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15468 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 8, 2016).
60. Id. at *12-13.
61. Id. at*16.
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62
has flouted a legal duty to check a record showing such violations."
However, the court reasoned that, had the carrier conducted the required
three-year safety performance investigation, it would have found only a
speeding ticket for driving less than ten miles over the speed limit and a
ticket for disobeying a traffic device. 63 The court found that failing to
consider these infractions, even if they were known by the carrier, does
64
not rise to the level of conscious indifference to the consequences.
Similarly, the court found that, while a criminal investigation would
have revealed several alcohol and drug-related arrests, there was no
evidence the driver was intoxicated during the collision or that
intoxication played a role in causing the collision. 65 As to the carrier's
failure to conduct a criminal background check, the court noted the
66
FMCSR do not require a criminal background check. Finally, the court
rejected the presence of several technical errors and omissions in the
carrier's FMCSR application. 67 None of the missing information
disqualified the driver from driving.6 8 In determining whether the
carrier's liability for punitive damages for negligent hiring, training, or
supervision, "the relevant question is not whether [the driver] was
technically qualified, but whether [the carrier] knew or had reason to
know [the driver] was 'incompetent or habitually reckless."'6

III. AVIATION LAW
70
Aviation law is an area highly regulated by the federal government
71
and, in some cases, international treaties. In fact, the stated purpose of

62. Id. at *12 (quoting MasTec, 325 Ga. App. at 866, 755 S.E.2d at 260).
63. Id. at *13-14.
64. Id. at *14.
65. Id.
66. Id at *14-15.
67. Id. at *15 (quoting Smith v Tommy Roberts Trucking Co., 290 Ga. App. 826, 828,
435 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1993)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at *15-16.
70. ROBIN C. LARNER, 15 GA. JUR. § 29:25 (2017) (stating "[flederal aviation regulations
have been promulgated to regulate virtually every aspect of aviation in the United States;
these regulations are duly published in accordance with law in the Code of Federal
Regulations, and they have the force of law.").
71. The Montreal Convention sets forth uniform rules for claims that arise out of
incidents that occur during international air transportation. See Marotte v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 296 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that "the Warsaw Convention is the
exclusive mechanism of recovery for personal injuries suffered on board an aircraft or in
the course of embarking or disembarking from an airplane."); Espinoza Ugaz v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (emphasizing that "[t]he Montreal
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Georgia's aviation statutes is "to coincide with the policies, principles,
and practices established by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and all
amendments thereto." 72 As a result, federal courts determine most of the
case law regulating commercial aviation. 73 However, several recent
developments in the Georgia General Assembly affect the current state
of aviation law. Recent aviation-related legislation in Georgia deals
primarily with two relatively new areas of aviation: space flight and
unmanned aircraft (drones).

A. Space Flight
The Georgia Space Flight Act, 74 passed on May 8, 2017, amended
Georgia's statutory tort law to facilitate space flight activity and limit the
liability of space flight entities for injuries sustained by participants.75
The new article defines related terms 7 6 and provides that Georgia law
governs any litigation or proceeding against "a space flight entity
pertaining to space flight activities."7 7 The statutory language defines
"space flight entity" expansively and includes: persons conducting space
flight activities and licensed by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and the State of Georgia; "a manufacturer or supplier of
components . . . or . . . vehicles used in space flight activities"; "an

employee, officer, director, owner, stockholder, member, manager,
advisor, or partner of the entity, manufacturer, or supplier"; "an owner
or lessor of real property on which space flight activities are conducted";
and any "state agency or local governmental unit with a contractual
relationship with [space flight entities]" or "having jurisdiction in the
territory in which space flight activities are conducted."78

Convention entered into force in the United States on November 4, 2003 and superceded
[sic] the Warsaw Convention.").
72. O.C.G.A. § 6-2-1 (2017).
73. However, Georgia courts will frequently look to federal aviation regulations when
addressing aviation-related issues under state law. See, e.g., Eagles Jets, LLC v. Atlanta
Jet, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 386, 740 S.E.2d 439 (2013) (discussing whether the Certificate of
Aircraft Registration required by the FAA constitutes ownership of the aircraft for purposes
of a contract dispute); Sky King 101, LLC v. Thurmond, 314 Ga. App. 377, 724 S.E.2d 412
(2012) (addressing FAA flight procedures and regulations when analyzing whether
defendant air transportation company had sufficient control over a co-pilot to be considered
his employer).
74. Ga. H.R. Bill 1, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 348 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-41-44).
75. Id.
76. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-41 (2017).
77. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-44 (2017).
78. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-41(a)(12)(A)-(F) (2017).
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Space flight entities will not be civilly or criminally liable for a
participant injury arising out of the "inherent risks associated with any
space flight activities," provided that the participant previously signed a
statutorily specified "warning and agreement."79 The liability limitation
does not apply to intentional acts or acts of gross negligence that
proximately caused the injury, nor does it apply to breach of contracts
related to the use of real property, or enforcement actions brought by the
state or federal government.8 0 This seemingly overbroad liability
limitation has not been tested in court, nor has the scope of "inherent
risks associated with any space flight activities."81
B. UnmannedAircraft
House Bill 481,82 passed on May 9, 2017, addressed the rising
popularity in drone aircrafts and the problems that come with drones.
The act amended Georgia's code provisions dealing with aviation to
define unmanned aircraft systems, to provide for and preempt
regulations dealing with those systems, and to repeal any conflicting
laws. 83 Under O.C.G.A. § 6-1-4(a), an "unmanned aircraft system" is
defined as a "powered, aerial vehicle" that "does not carry a human
operator," does not require operation by a human from within or on the
aircraft, "uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift," "can fly
autonomously or be piloted remotely," and "can be expendable or
recoverable."8
The new code section permits state agencies, counties, municipalities,
and other political subdivisions to adopt "an ordinance that provides for
or prohibits the launch or intentional landing of an unmanned aircraft
88
Counties, municipalities, and
system from or on its public property."
not authorized, however, to
are
of
the
state
subdivisions
political
other
launch or landing of drones
the
or
prohibit
to
provide
ordinances
adopt
of an unmanned aircraft
operation
to
the
respect
"with
property
on its
86
section also prevents
new
code
The
purposes."
commercial
for
system

79. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-42(a) (2017) (providing for limitations of liability of space flight
entities); O.C.G.A. § 51-3-43 (2017) (specifying the language required for a valid warning
and agreement sufficient to limit a space flight entity's liability).
80. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-42(b) (2017).
81. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-42(a).
82. Ga. H.R. Bill 481, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 268 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 6-1-4
(2017)).
83. Id.
84. O.C.G.A. § 6-1-4(a) (2017).
85. O.C.G.A. § 6-1-4(b) (2017).
86. Id.
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counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions from regulating
the testing or operation of drones, except to the extent the regulations
adopt FAA restrictions or enforce ordinances in effect before April 1,
2017.87

C. Miscellaneous Legislation
Other recent aviation legislation includes 2015's House Bill 84,88
requiring aircraft insurance policies to include conspicuous notice of
specified exclusions or conditions,8 9 and 2012's Senate Bill 371,90
permitting counties and municipalities to "enter into cooperative
agreements with community improvement districts" to improve local
airports and landing fields.91
IV. TRANSPORTATION FOR HIRE: TAXICABS, LIMOUSINES,
AND RIDESHARE SERVICES

The past five years have seen significant updates to the laws regarding
transportation for hire, making regulations more consistent across the
state and adapting to the new phenomenon of rideshare services.
In 2012, Georgia enacted the Georgia Motor Common Carrier Act. 92
The Motor Common Carrier Act primarily served to consolidate
regulation and enforcement of transportation functions by transferring
regulatory authority over motor carriers 93 and limousine carriers from
the Georgia Public Service Commission to the Department of Public
Safety. 94 Particularly relevant to limousine-for-hire companies is Part 3

87. O.C.G.A. § 6-1-4 (2017).
88. Ga. H.R. Bill 84, Reg. Sess., 2015 Ga. Laws 824 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
§ 33-24-30(c)).
89. See Lima Delta Co. v. Global RI-022 Aerospace, Inc., 338 Ga. App. 40, 789 S.E.2d
230 (2016) (addressing an aircraft insurance policy dispute and noting that the conspicuous
notice requirement applies to policies issued or renewed on or after July 1, 2015).
90. Ga. S. Bill 371, Reg. Sess., 2012 Ga. Laws 1342 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
§ 6-3-20 (2017)).
91. Id.
92. Ga. H.R. Bill 865, Reg. Sess., 2012 Ga. Laws Act 580, § 1 (codified as amended at
O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-50-57, 40-1-100-130, 40-1-150-170 (2017)).
93. For more on the Georgia Motor Common Carrier Act's effect on trucking, motor
coach, and mass transit operations, see supra Section II.
94. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-51 (providing "[t]he General Assembly finds that the for-hire
transportation of persons and property are a privilege that require close regulation and
control to protect public welfare, provide for a competitive business environment, and
provide for consumer protection. To that end, the provisions of this article are enacted....
The Department of Public Safety is designated as the agency to implement and enforce this
article."); Press Release, Georgia Public Service Commission, Governor Deal Signs Bill to
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of the Motor Common Carrier Act, known as the "Georgia Limousine
Carrier Act" (LCA).95 In its current form, the LCA makes it the
Department of Public Safety's duty to issue limousine carrier certificates,
to establish the requirements therefor, and to regulate and inspect
limousine safety. 96 The LCA further sets forth requirements for liability
and commercial indemnity insurance, advertisements, limousines that
permit consumption of alcohol by passengers, and license plate and
driver's
license
endorsements. 97
The
Act
establishes
a
procedural-due-process requirement for new orders and regulations
directed at any limousine carrier and explicitly preempts the field,
precluding limousine regulations and taxation previously established by
county and municipal authorities, with limited exceptions pertaining to
county and municipal airports.98
The rideshare network Uber arrived in Atlanta in August 2012,99
followed by Lyft in August 2013.100 Initially outside the scope of laws
governing traditional taxicab drivers, rideshare networks eventually
were brought into Georgia's regulatory fold with the enactment of House
Bill 225101 in 2015. House Bill 225 was the General Assembly's effort to
"provide uniform administration and parity among ride share network
services, transportation referral services, and transportation referral
service providers, including taxi services, that operate in this state for

Transfer Transportation from Public Service Commission to Department of Public Safety
(May 1, 2012).
95. Ga. H.R. Bill 865, Reg. Sess., 2012 Ga. Laws 580, § 3 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§ 40-1-150-170 (2017)).
96. O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-153-54, 40-1-156-57, 40-1-159, 40-1-161 (2017). Originally, the
Department of Driver Services (DDS) was responsible for regulating and issuing the
required limousine chauffeur authorization and license endorsement to limousine drivers;
in its current form, the statute replaces chauffeur authorizations and endorsements with a
"for-hire license endorsement or private background check certification" regulated by DDS.
Compare O.C.G.A. § 40-1-158 (2012) with O.C.G.A. § 40-1-158 (2017). The regulations
governing limousine carriers are codified at Georgia Rules and Regulations Subject
515-16-8, except DDS's regulations of limousine chauffeur permits, which are located at
Subject 375-5-5. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 515-16-8 (2017); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 375-5-5
(2017).
97. O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-160, 40-1-165-67 (2017).
98. O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-162, 40-1-164, 40-1-168 (2017).
99. Uber Atlanta Launches, UBER BLOG (last visited Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.uber.com/blog/atlanta/uber-atlanta-launches-spottieottiedopaliscious/.
100. Ryan Lawler, Lyft Launches Its Ride-Sharing Service in 3 New Markets:
Indianapolis, St. Paul, and Atlanta, TECHCRUNCH (last visited Sept. 18, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2013/08/29/lyft-indianapolis-st-paul-atlantal.
101. Ga. H.R. Bill 225, Reg. Sess., 2015 Ga. Laws 1262 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
§§ 40-1-190-200 (2017)).
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the safety and protection of the public."1 02 The law sets forth registration,
recordkeeping, and advertising requirements for all transportation
referral service providers, taxi services, and ride share networks in the
state, imposes licensure requirements on all drivers for such services,
and addresses rates and fees.103 Tort lawyers should note, in particular,
that O.C.G.A. § 40-1-199104 renders invalid any waiver of rights related
to personal injury as a result of such services unless the customer is given
written or electronic notice prior to receiving the services and makes the
waiver knowingly and willfully. 0 5
House Bill 225 explicitly preempts the field of taxi and rideshare
regulations, except that county and municipal airports may regulate
taxis and rideshares to the same extent and by the same process provided
for limousines in O.C.G.A. § 40-1-162.106 In furtherance of this
consolidation of regulations, the law also explicitly restricted local
governments' prior authority over authorizing taxicabs to operate within
their borders.

107

Under prior law, O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(a)108 authorized local
governments to require "the owner or operator of a taxicab or vehicle for
hire" to obtain a Certificate of Public Necessity and Convenience
(CPNC)-a "taxi medallion"-to operate such vehicles within that
locality.1 09 House Bill 225 amended O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25 in two significant
ways. First, counties and municipalities that already had valid
ordinances to this effect in place as of July 1, 2014 may continue to
require such CPNCs, but no new ordinances or regulations regarding
CPNCs may be adopted or enforced.1 0 Second, the phrase "vehicle for
hire" was struck from the statute, so that even preexisting CPNC
ordinances may only be enforced against taxicab owners-that is, no local

102. O.C.G.A. §40-1-191 (2017).
103. O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-191-96, 40-1-198 (2017). Section 40-1-193.1 was added to this part
in 2016 and became effective on January 1, 2017. Ga. S. Bill 320, Reg. Sess., 2016 Ga. Laws
573 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-1-193.1 (2017)). The regulations issued by the Department
of Public Safety are located at GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 570-35-.01-.12 (2017).
104. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-199 (2017).
105. Id.
106. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-191 (2017).
107. O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25 (2017).
108. O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25(a) (2017).
109. Abramyan v. State, 301 Ga. 308, 308, 800 S.E.2d 366, 367 (2017) (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 36-60-25(a) (2007)).
110. Ga. H.R. Bill 225, Reg. Sess., 2015 Ga. Laws 1262 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
§ 36-60-25 (2017)).
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government can require rideshare drivers to obtain CPNCs in order to
operate within its borders.111
This amendment was the basis for the lawsuit brought by a group of
Atlanta taxi drivers in Abramyan v. State. The City of Atlanta (the City)
created an extensive regulatory scheme consistent with its pre-2015
statutory authority, including requiring CPNCs for all taxicabs and
vehicles for hire within the city limits and "capping the number of
available CPNCs at 1600." When House Bill 225 went into effect, thus
leaving Atlanta's CPNC requirement in place for taxicabs but preventing
the City from applying it to rideshare drivers, the plaintiff taxi drivers
argued this amounted to an "unconstitutional taking and inverse
condemnation of their property." 112 Specifically, the plaintiffs contended
"they were deprived of their constitutionally protected 'exclusive right to
provide rides originating in the city limits which charged fares based on
time and mileage' and that the Act damaged the value of their CPNCs."113
The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed.11 4 The plaintiffs' property
interest, if it existed, was in the CPNCs they purchased; the Act did not
deprive them of those CPNCs or of their right to conduct their taxicab
businesses.115 The plaintiffs only argued that the value of their CPNCs
arose from their exclusivity, which had been reduced by the introduction
of an unlimited number of CPNC-free rideshare drivers into the Atlanta
market. 116 The supreme court held the City's cap of 1600 CPNCs was
contingent on changeable variables and the cap could have been
increased by either the City or legislature at any time, regardless of the
new amendment, so the cap did not create a protected property interest
in either exclusivity or a limited supply of CPNCs.117 The state was not
required to ensure the taxicab drivers "against all shrinkage of values
that might result from the passage of laws intended for the public
good." 118 The taxi drivers' constitutional challenge to House Bill 225
failed, and the state's preemption of local regulations on rideshare
networks stood.119

111. Id.
112. Abramyan, 301 Ga. at 308-09, 800 S.E.2d at 368.
113. Id. at 309, 800 S.E.2d at 368.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 310, 800 S.E.2d at 369.
116. Id. at 311, 800 S.E.2d at 369.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 312, 800 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting Menken v. City of Atlanta, 78 Ga. 668, 678,
2 S.E. 559, 564 (1887)).
119. Id. Shortly before Abramyan, the federal courts likewise dismissed a constitutional
challenge regarding the City of Atlanta's CPNC regulations. In Delta Cab Ass'n v. City of
Atlanta, the district court and a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
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V. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
In 2017, the Georgia General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 219,120
placing Georgia among the few states to adopt regimes for testing and
operating autonomous vehicles (or self-driving cars) on public roads. 121
Before a fully autonomous vehicle may operate with the automated
driving system engaged and without a human driver present in the
vehicle, certain minimum safety, registration, and insurance
requirements must be satisfied.1 22
Specifically, the vehicle must be capable of complying with the Georgia
Uniform Rules of the Road1 23 and must be certified by the manufacturer
as complying with applicable federal standards (unless federal or state
law grants an exemption), must be capable of remaining on the scene of
an accident and promptly notifying local law enforcement of the accident,
and must be able to "achieve a minimal risk condition" in the event the
automated driving system fails.1 24 The law, thus, effectively makes the
manufacturer, who causes the autonomous vehicle to move via the
automated driving system, the "operator" of the car for purposes of the
Uniform Rules of the Road and allows the manufacturer to be held liable
for a wreck caused by a failure of the automated driving system. 125 As an
additional precaution during this experimental period in the
Eleventh Circuit held that the CPNC regulations did not grant the plaintiff taxicab
association a procedural due process right to obtain CPNCs and that the association's
inability to operate a taxicab business without CPNCs did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Delta Cab Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1246-47 (N.D. Ga. 2014),
af'd, 606 F. App'x 565 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
120. Ga. S. Bill 219, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 549 (codified as amended in tit. 40, chs.
1, 5, 6, 8).
121. Fiza Pirani, Georgia Officially OKs Self-driving Cars on Public Roads, AJC.COM
(last visited Sept. 18, 2017), http://www.aje.com/news/local/georgia-officially-oks-self-driv
ing-cars-public-roads/iMua261DS8mOsvE2bFv4vM/.
122. See Ga. S. Bill 219, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 549.
123. O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-1-397 (2017).
124. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11(a)(1)-(a)(3) (2017). "'Minimal risk condition' means a low-risk
operating mode in which a fully autonomous vehicle operating without a human driver
achieves a reasonably safe state, such as bringing the vehicle to a complete stop, upon
experiencing a failure of the vehicle's automated driving system that renders the vehicle
unable to perform the entire dynamic driving task." O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(27.1).
125. When a fully automated vehicle is being operated by the automated driving system,
the vehicle and its operator are exempted from the driver's-license requirement, but
automated vehicles must be properly registered and their occupants must comply with the
law regarding use of seatbelts and child passenger restraint systems. O.C.G.A.
§§ 40-5-21(a)(13), 40-8-11(a)(1)-(a)(3), 40-8-11(a)(5), 40-8-11(b) (2017). "'Operator' means
any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle or who causes a
fully autonomous vehicle to move or travel with the automated driving system engaged."
O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(38) (2017).
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development of self-driving cars, automated vehicles must carry 250% of
the statutory minimum insurance coverage until December 31, 2019.126
Beginning on January 1, 2020, the required insurance coverage will drop
to the otherwise applicable minimum limitS. 1 27

Senate Bill 219 specifies that these statutes and the Uniform Rules of
the Road are the exclusive legislation governing autonomous vehicles in
Georgia, including any commercial use or operation of autonomous
vehicles, and no rules or regulations may be promulgated that would
further restrict the operation of autonomous vehicles or automated
driving systems. 128 Thus, as autonomous vehicles become closer to
reality, the door is open in Georgia for their use not only as private
passenger vehicles, but in a multitude of commercial settings, from
shipping to mass and charter transit to transportation for hire.
VI. RAILROADS
As noted by the Georgia Court of Appeals, "[r]ailroads are among the
most heavily regulated American industries." 129 Federal legislation, such
as the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA),130 comprises the vast majority
of this regulation. 13 1 Moreover, many state or local laws or regulations
related to railroad safety or security will typically be preempted by
federal law. 132 Accordingly, the Georgia General Assembly has not
enacted recent legislation regulating commercial rail transportation.
However, some recent Georgia cases touching upon railroads and the
commercial rail industry demonstrate the interplay between federal
regulations and preemption while highlighting those areas that may still
be decided by state law.
In Midville River Tract, LLC v. Central of Georgia Railroad Co.,133
Midville filed suit after "a train operated by Central of Georgia Railroad
Company and partly owned by Norfolk Southern Railway Company ...
derailed . . . causing a chemical spill onto real property owned by

[Midville]." Midville asserted that the derailment resulted from a

126. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11(a)(4)(A) (2017).
127. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11(a)(4)(B) (2017).
128. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11(c) (2017). This new law does not specifically address how it will
interact with existing product liability laws.
129. Midville River Tract, LLC v. Cent. of Ga. R.R. Co., 339 Ga. App. 546, 548, 794
S.E.2d 192, 194 (2016) (quoting Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir.
2013)).
130. 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-311 (2017).
131. See Midville River Tract, 339 Ga. App. at 548, 794 S.E.2d at 194.
132. Id.
133. 339 Ga. App. 546, 794 S.E.2d 192 (2016).
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negligently welded track rail. The trial court determined that Midville's
negligence claims were preempted by the FRSA.134
The FRSA "provides, in part, that federal law does not preempt state
law causes of action seeking to recover for damage to property" when it
is alleged that the defendant railroad "(A) has failed to comply with the
Federal standard of care established by a regulation or order issued by
the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters)"
or "(B) has failed to comply with its own plan, rule, or standard that it
created pursuant to a regulation or order issued by [the Secretary of
Transportation]."1 35 Midville asserted that "federal law required the
Railroads to prescribe internal standards .

.

. and procedures governing

the safe installation of continuous welded rail, and that the Railroads[']
[failure] to comply with their own internal standard . . . governing

thermite welding" amounted to a nonpreempted claim under 49 U.S.C.
§ 20106(b)(1)(B).136
The court of appeals rejected this argument. 137 Specifically, the court
held that the record failed to establish that the internal thermite welding
standard was created pursuant to a regulation or order from the
Secretary of Transportation.1 38 Instead, the relevant federal regulations
required railroads to have a plan regarding the installation of continuous
welded rail, with minimum required elements, and that the plan be filed
with and approved by the Federal Railroad Administration.1 39 No federal
regulations required such a plan for thermite welding.1 40 Accordingly, the
court of appeals held that, because the railroad defendants' internal
standard regarding thermite welding was not "created pursuant to a
regulation or order issued by the [Secretary of Transportation]," 141 the
internal standard exceeded the minimum plan requirements set forth by

134. Id. at 546, 794 S.E.2d at 192-93.
135. Id. at 549, 794 S.E.2d at 194 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1) (2017)). The FRSA
also exempts state law actions alleging that a party "has failed to comply with a State law,
regulation, or order that is not incompatible with subsection (a)(2)." 49 U.S.C.
§ 20106(b)(1)(C) (2017). Subsection(a)(2), in turn, permits a State to adopt its own laws and
regulations related to railroad safety or security, including more stringent requirements,
provided that the law, regulation, or order "(A) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety or security hazard; (B) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or
order of the United States Government; and (C) does not unreasonably burden interstate
commerce." 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2) (2017).
136. Midville River Tract, 339 Ga. App. at 549, 794 S.E.2d at 194.
137. Id. at 549-50, 794 S.E.2d at 194-95.
138. Id. at 549, 794 S.E.2d at 194.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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federal regulations and, therefore, any cause of action based on a
violation of this standard was preempted by federal law.142
The decision in Midville River Tract demonstrates that litigation
against a railroad company and evaluation of federal preemption issues
will typically be highly fact-oriented and turn on the specific issue
addressed by a federal regulation. Another recent court of appeals
decision, however, shows the difficulty in holding a railroad defendant
liable even where there is a clear violation of a federal regulation.
In Smith v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,14 3 the plaintiffs sued
Norfolk Southern on behalf of their father, who was killed in a railway
crossing collision. Specifically, the decedent was a passenger in a truck
involved in a motor vehicle accident that caused it to stop on the railroad
tracks at a crossing. The engineer testified that, while he initially
sounded the train's horn when approaching the crossing, he stopped
blowing the horn to begin emergency braking procedures and applied the
horn again roughly two seconds before impact. As a result, as the train
approached the crossing, there was a sixteen-second gap between the
first and second horn blast. Testimony indicated that, as the train
approached, the decedent appeared dazed or confused and was unable to
run to safety. The train struck the truck, which struck the decedent.144
Federal regulations specify how a train horn must be sounded at a
public highway railroad crossing. Norfolk Southern adopted internal
operating rules consistent with the federal regulations. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs alleged that Norfolk Southern committed ordinary negligence
and negligence per se for, inter alia, violating the federal regulations and
its own internal standards regarding horn blasts. Plaintiffs argued that,
had the approaching train properly alerted the decedent with the
required pattern of horn blasts, decedent would have been able to escape
the path of the oncoming train.145
State-law claims alleging that a railroad failed to comply with federal
regulations or internal standards created pursuant to an order by the
Secretary of Transportation are not preempted by federal law. 146
However, in Smith, the jury declined to hold Norfolk Southern liable for
the alleged failure to comply with federal regulations and its own
internal operating rules, finding "that the plaintiffs had not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that Norfolk Southern 'violated 49 CFR.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 549-50, 794 S.E.2d at 194-95.
337 Ga. App. 604, 788 S.E.2d 508 (2016).
Id. at 604-07, 788 S.E.2d at 511-13.
Id. at 606-07, 788 S.E.2d at 512-13.
49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)(1).
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§ 222.21 and that such violation was a proximate cause of [decedent's
death]."'147

The plaintiffs appealed the verdict, arguing, in part, that "there was
no evidence that the engineer was faced with a choice between blowing
the horn and applying the emergency braking procedures," so "the trial
court erred by charging the jury on the defense of sudden emergency."148
The plaintiffs also argued that the sudden emergency defense was
preempted by federal regulations specifying how a train horn must be
sounded. 149 The court of appeals rejected both arguments, determining
that the evidence supported the charge on the sudden emergency defense,
and that the plaintiffs had waived their argument regarding the horn
regulation preemption by not objecting on those specific grounds before
the trial court.150 The court of appeals reasoned that any error in the
sudden emergency charge did not amount to substantial error, and
therefore did not require reversal of the case. 15 1
Ultimately, while not presenting a federal preemption issue, 152 Smith,
like Midville River Tract, reinforces the highly fact-specific effect that
federal railroad regulations may have on a state case. Accordingly,
evaluating any commercial rail transportation case requires an in-depth
analysis of federal legislation and regulations, internal standards and
operating rules, and preemption issues.

147. Smith, 337 Ga. App. at 608, 788 S.E.2d at 513.
148. Id. at 608, 788 S.E.2d at 513-14. The sudden emergency defense is appropriate
where the evidence shows that there has been a sudden peril caused by
circumstances in which the defendant did not participate and which offered him
a choice of conduct without time for thought; under such circumstances,
negligence in his choice might be attributable not to lack of care but to lack of
time to assess the situation.
Id. at 609, 788 S.E.2d at 514 (quoting Jimenez v. Morgan Drive Away, 238 Ga. App. 638,
641, 519 S.E.2d 722, 725 (1999)).
149. Smith, 337 Ga. App. at 610, 788 S.E.2d at 515.
150. Id. at 611-12, 788 S.E.2d at 515-16.
151. Id. at 612-13, 788 S.E.2d at 516.
152. For an in-depth analysis regarding federal preemption of railroad claims, see Fox
v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 342 Ga. App. 38, 802 S.E.2d 319 (2017). In Fox, the court of
appeals addressed whether the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1996
(ICCTA) preempted a property owner's inverse condemnation claim against a defendant
railroad. Id. at 42, 802 S.E.2d at 325. ICCTA created the Surface Transportation Board,
which retains exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of railroad transportation,
including the transportation by rail carriers. Id. at 55, 802 S.E.2d at 333; see 49 U.S.C.
§§ 10101, 10102(1), 10501(b) (2017).
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VII. CONCLUSION

To successfully navigate each of the above areas of commercial
transportation, a thorough understanding of both state and federal law
and their interaction is a necessity. Each of the four areas of commercial
transportation discussed above are subject to significant federal
regulation. Further, the law in each of these areas is rapidly changing as
state and federal legislators struggle to keep up with the fast-changing
technology and businesses.
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